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1 Introduction
Since my PhD, all my research works have been centered on competition policy
issues. I have mainly used the methods of theoretical Industrial Organization, and
in some recent works, I also started using empirical methods. A common thread
running through many of my papers is the focus on vertical relations between
suppliers and buyers with market power. My PhD essay, entitled “Structures de
marche´ et re´glementation : les fondements des rapports de force entre producteurs
et distributeurs”, was about the relationships between producers and retailers. It
focused on the balance of power between the large retail chains and their suppliers,
and on the way it is influenced by market structure and by the regulatory envi-
ronment. Since then, the analysis of conflicts and negotiations in vertical chains
has been a central topic of my research work. These questions naturally led me
to discover other topics in competition policy, and I progressively extended my
research field to issues such as collusion or mergers.
I started my PhD in 1996, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,
under the supervision of Bernard Salanie´. I obtained a PhD grant from CREST,
and I spent three years at Laboratoire d’Economie Industrielle (CREST-LEI) be-
fore becoming a junior Lecturer at ENSAE for two years. I then became a CNRS
researcherand joined the Ecole Polytechnique in 2001, and I remained an associate
member of CREST until today, when the Economics Department of Ecole Poly-
technique is merging with CREST. A few years after I joined CNRS, I spent one
year at London Business School in 2005-2006. I kept visiting LBS on a regular
basis for the next few years.
During my PhD I wrote a case study with Claire Chambolle (INRA ALISS),
who obtained a one-year grant at CREST to finish her own PhD on a closely re-
lated topic. This was the first of a long series of collaborations. A few years after,
we started a collaboration with Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics). We
are about to finish our first paper together, and we have other projects. I am espe-
cially grateful to both of them. Over the years, I also benefited from stimulating
research collaboration with several researchers, among whom Sofia Berto Villas
Boas (University of California Berkeley), Marcel Boyer (University of Montre´al),
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Cle´mence Christin (University of Caen), Laurent Flochel (CRA), Emeric Henry
(Science Po), Margaret Kyle (Mines ParisTech), Jean-Pierre Ponssard (Ecole Poly-
technique), Said Souam (CREST), Ste´phane Turolla (INRA, SMART), Thibaud
Verge´ (CREST) and Patrick Waelbroeck (Telecom ParisTech). I also benefited
from my interactions with other researchers, especially Anne Perrot (MAPP), who
advised me and introduced me to real-world competition issues, Ste´phane Caprice
(Toulouse School of Economics), who used to share my office while we were writing
our PhD essays on similar topics, Laurent Linnemer (CREST), Philippe Fe´vrier
(CREST), Denis Gromb (INSEAD), Je´roˆme Pouyet (Paris School of Economics),
Eric Avenel (University of Rennes), Hans-Theo Normann (Duesseldorf Institute
for Competition Economics), Ozlem Bedre (European School of Management and
Technology), Nicolas Schutz (University of Mannheim), Sabrina Teyssier (INRA-
ALISS) and Rida Laraki (Ecole Polytechnique), among others.
The first part of this note is a research summary that presents an overview
of my research works since I finished my PhD. This part is organized in three
sections: the first section focuses on vertical relations and competition in the retail
sector; the second section presents some works on vertical relations, investments
and innovations, and the third section presents my research works on cartels and
mergers. The second part of this note presents my main research perspectives in
the short and medium term.
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2 Research summary
This research summary will be organized along three lines. The first line of research
presents the works I did after I completed my PhD, when I continued working on
the issue I had investigated in my dissertation, that is, the relationships between
manufacturers and retailers. I tried to improve my knowledge of the retail sector,
and of the sector-specific regulation. This applied work then led me to consider
some issues about vertical contracts and price restraints from a more theoretical
perspective.
A few years after I joined CNRS, I progressively started working on new
projects that still dealt with vertical relations, but with a different focus on the
“long term” effects of vertical relations on investment and innovation. These works
constitute the second line of research that I will present in section 2.2. A first set
of papers investigates the effect of vertical integration on the firms’ incentives to
invest, for instance in an innovative process, in a context of upstream and down-
stream imperfect competition. Another paper considers the effect of competition
among the potential buyers, hence buyer power, on the efficiency of the innovation
process; it analyzes how competition between the potential buyers of a license may
affect inefficient delays in the signature of license contracts.
Finally, I investigated more general competition policy issues, especially those
related to “alliances” between firms, such as cartels and mergers. In these works,
presented in section 2.3, I study the way some kind of cooperation between the
firms may impact competition and welfare. A first set of papers deals with cartel
deterrence, and more precisely the issue of whether fines against cartels are set at
a proper level. A second set of papers analyzes horizontal mergers in vertically
related industries, both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspectives.
In what follows, I will present references to the relevant economic literature for
each topic. However, as the theme of vertical relationships is running through most
of my work, I am going to introduce briefly here a few reference articles from the In-
dustrial Organization literature on this theme. Since the seminal work by Spengler
(1950), who brought forward the idea of double marginalization, a large stream of
literature has attempted to understand how this vertical externality can combine
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with horizontal competition. The literature on intrabrand competition developed
in the 1980-1990s has focused on vertical restraints that can restore vertical control
in the case of a monopolist supplier selling to competitive retailers (see Rey and
Tirole, 1986, and Mathewson and Winter, 1984). The issue of negotiation inside
the vertical chain has then been studied to account for the possible existence of
buyer power (see for instance Inderst and Wey, 2007, or Chipty and Snyder, 1999),
while some papers have “reversed” the usual framework to study the relationships
between a monopolist downstream firm and its competitive suppliers (see Marx
and Shaffer, 1999), or between a duopoly of imperfectly competitive downstream
firms and their perfectly competititve suppliers (Shaffer, 1991). The most recent
strand of literature attempts to account for imperfect competition in both the up-
stream and the downstream industries; however, the study of these “interlocking
relationships” raises technical issues, among which the possible non-existence of
equilibria (see Rey and Verge´, 2010).
In this summary I will also refer to the literature on vertical integration. Verti-
cal integration is known to have welfare-enhancing effects in many circumstances,
through the elimination of double marginalization, hold-up, or free riding dis-
tortions. Its possible anti-competitive effects rely on more complex exclusionary
mechanisms: vertical foreclosure characterizes situations where full access to a
necessary input is denied to competitors by an integrated firm. The rationale for
foreclosure has long been the subject of an economic debate. The Chicago School
claimed that, as a monopolist can extend its power to vertically related segments,
vertical integration cannot increase the profit of the merging firms in the absence
of efficiency gains (see Bork, 1978 or Posner, 1976): vertical mergers should thus
not be considered as potentially anticompetitive, and should be authorized. This
argument raised a debate that led to more rigorous research on the welfare effects
of vertical integration (see Rey and Tirole, 2007). Two seminal papers by Hart
and Tirole (1990), and Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) have opened new per-
spectives. The former explains how vertical integration may restore market power;
the latter how it may create a new source of market power.
I will now present a summary of my research works. I will proceed in three
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sections, each of them dedicated to one of the above-mentioned research lines.
I will start in section 2.1 by presenting my researches on vertical relations and
competition in the retail sector.
2.1 Vertical relations and competition in the retail sector
So far, a large part of my research work has been dedicated to the economic
analysis of retailing, especially the study of vertical relations between producers
and retailers. I have worked on this field both from a theoretical perspective and
from a policy-oriented perspective, and I have regularly contributed to the debate
on regulatory reforms in the retail sector. In my PhD dissertation, I focused on
the determinants of the balance of power between producers and retailers, and I
explored how market structure and regulation may affect these relationships. Since
then, the analysis of conflicts between retailers and their suppliers has constantly
been a central topic of my research work.
Right after my PhD I wrote, in collaboration with Claire Chambolle, a survey of
the theoretical literature on vertical relations centered on profit-sharing between
the upstream and downstream industries. In this paper, published in 2003 in
Economie Rurale, we point out the role of market structure and regulation. The
issue of how market structure affects profit-sharing between manufacturers and
retailers was also at the center of a paper derived from a chapter of my PhD
dissertation, published in 2002 in Louvain Economic Review. In “The Balance
of Power Between Producers and Retailers: a Differentiation Model”, I built a
tractable model of successive duopolies in a market with a captive demand, and I
studied how horizontal differentiation in the upstream and downstream industries
influences margins and profit-sharing.
This section presents my works on the economics of retailing. It is organized
in three parts. I will first give an overview of the retail industry, before addressing
some issues related to its reglementation. I will then present a set of theoretical
research works on pricing restraints and the policy implications that can be derived
from the results.
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2.1.1 Overview of the retail sector
When I joined CNRS in 2001, I started working with Claire Chambolle on a book,
intended for a non-specialized readership, on the economics of retailing. “Economie
de la Distribution” was published in 2003 by the Editions la De´couverte, in the
“Repe`res” Collection. Our purpose in this book is to provide a general picture of
the sector, of its role in the economy and of the historical evolution that led to
the creation of the large retail chains active today. We highlight the competitive
issues at stake. The first part of the book describes the evolution of the retail
sector. We first present the main features of the retail industry and offer some
statistics that illustrate its economic weight. We then trace the historical evolution
of the industry and the emergence of mass distribution. In the second part, we
analyze competition between retailers, their relationships with manufacturers and
the sector-specific regulations from an industrial organization perspective. Writing
this book gave me a better understanding of the retail industry, and helped me
identify relevant policy issues that led to further research.
More recently, I wrote with Claire Chambolle and Ste´phane Turolla an article
in a collective book entitled A quoi sert la concurrence? This book, edited in 2014
by M. Behar-Touchais, N. Charbit and R. Amaro, aims at offering a comprehensive
overview of competition to a large audience through a collection of short articles.
In “La concurrence dans le secteur de la distribution”, we review the determi-
nants of competition in the retail sector. We first point out the twofold dimension
of retail competition, which is determined by national as well as local factors.
We then analyze how the sector-specific regulation has impacted the competitive
environment, especially by defining the conditions of entry and the contracting
possibilities. The issue of the influence of regulation on the competitive environ-
ment of the retail sector is developed more in-depth in the works presented in the
next sub-section.
2.1.2 Sector-specific regulation
In France, firms in the retail sector must comply with a large set of specific rules
that add to the general business and competition law. Over the years, many
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reforms have attempted to modify the evolution of the sector, with varying and
sometimes conflicting objectives - among others, protecting the small, independent
stores, protecting the consumers against high prices / bad quality / low variety,
protecting the suppliers (especially farmers and small food producers) from retail-
ers’ buyer power, and even protecting all agents from the possible entry of hard
discounters.
I was first introduced to these issues during my PhD. Soon after, I wrote with
Claire Chambolle an article entitled “Les relations entre producteurs et distribu-
teurs : bilan et limites de trente ans de re´gulation”, published in 2003 in the Revue
Franc¸aise d’Economie. In this paper, we provide a critical review of the sector-
specific regulation of the retailing industry in France. We review the rules that
govern the control of market structures and the contractual relations between the
firms.
I will focus first on the regulation of entry, before turning to contractual rela-
tions in the next subsection. I will talk about merger control in section 2.3.2.
Entry regulation
The evolution of retail market structures is constrained by the general merger
control, and by specific laws controlling entry in the retail sector. The entry of
new stores with a surface over a given threshold (this threshold has been modified
a couple of times), or the expansion of existing stores, are restricted by specific
laws. The Raffarin Act enacted in 1997 made the regulation of entry particularly
restrictive compared to other European countries, by conditioning the opening
of a new store (or the expansion of an existing one) to the approval of a local
commission (Commission De´partementale d’Equipement Commercial, or CDEC),
gathering elected representatives and qualified leading figures. These commissions
were supposed to control the balance between different retail formats. However,
several corruption cases have pointed out the dysfunction of these commissions.
More generally, restricting entry in the retail sector has contributed to increasing
the main retail chains’ market power. During my PhD, I addressed this issue with
Laurent Flochel. In “Contrainte de capacite´ et de´veloppement des marques de
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distributeurs”, published in 2001 in Revue Economique, we look at the impact of
the law on profit sharing from the angle of the limitation of retailers’ sales capacity.
We show that, were entry free at the retailers’ level, a restriction of shelf space,
as imposed by the Raffarin law, could improve producers’ profit by slowing down
the development of own brands. However, barriers to entry on the downstream
market suppress this effect.
The Raffarin Act was amended by the Loi de Modernisation e´conomique (LME)
in 2008. This act increased the surface threshold over which the opening of a new
store has to be approved by the CDEC. However, this reform was limited and
arrived late. In its Opinion No 10-A-26, the Autorite´ de la Concurrence stresses
these limits, by noting that “the Autorite´ de la concurrence believes that the level
of concentration in some customer catchment areas is excessively high, particularly
for hypermarkets and local shops. For this latter retail format, the case of Paris,
in which only two retail chains, active under several different retail-brands, are
actually in competition, needs to be highlighted. This concentration of customer
catchment areas is all the more worrying as the food retail sector has major barriers
to entry which result, in particular, from regulations governing the establishment
of new shops and the relative scarcity of commercial land.”
In 2011, I published in Concurrences a paper written with Claire Chambolle
and Cle´mence Christin, entitled “Analyse critique des re´formes de la re`glementation
de la distribution franc¸aise”, in which we review the recent reforms of the sector-
specific regulation in France. We point out that the reform of the Raffarin law
is too limited to restore efficient competition at the local level and suggest pos-
sible reforms. We also consider the reforms from the angle of the regulation of
the contractual relations. I will give more details on these aspects in the next
subsection.
Finally, in december 2014, I have been invited, with several economists, by the
French Minister of Economics to participate in a meeting to discuss about a new
Bill, now called the “Macron Act”. In this meeting I had the occasion to express
my views on the need to remove barriers to entry in the retail sector, especially by
facilitating the transfers of stores between chains.
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Contractual relations between producers and retailers
The contractual relationships between the retailers and their suppliers are also
regulated in France by the “Code de Commerce”. I have specially studied the
economic consequences of the ban on retailer’s loss leading. This ban prevailed in
France since 1963, but its redefinition in 1996 in the “Loi No 96-588 du 1er juillet
1996 sur la loyaute´ et l’e´quilibre des relations commerciales”, also called Galland
Act, made it much more constraining.
More precisely, the Galland law prevents retailers from setting the price of a
good below a threshold defined as the net invoice price, excluding all off-invoice and
anticipated rebates that are not already on the bill at the time of delivery, plus the
transport cost. All rebates that are already deducted on the invoice are included
in the threshold, but the conditional rebates that are not already deducted on the
invoice are not included in the threshold, even if their conditional amount is known
(for instance, if they are published in the general terms of sale) and if they are
anticipated by the retailer. For instance, slotting fees that are often negotiated
on an annual basis and paid at the end of the year cannot be integrated in the
threshold. In most cases, the real unit price paid by the retailer to the manufacturer
is much lower than the unit price invoiced: the so-called “backroom margins”,
that gather discounts, rebates and commercial services paid by the producers to
the retailers, are non-transparent and difficult to measure. Commonly accepted
estimates by ILEC (an association of French Producers) evaluated them to about
60% of the unit price invoiced in France at the end of the nineties. In addition to
the ban on loss leading, the “Code de Commerce”requires that general terms of
sales offered by producers to “similar”customers had to be non-discriminatory. In
other words, a manufacturer cannot set different unit prices to its various retailers,
which means that the threshold imposed by the Galland Act was uniform across
retailers.
Similar bans on loss-leading exists in other countries, but the way it is coupled
with non-discrimination requirements makes the French law rather specific. In
“Loss-Leaders Banning Laws as Vertical Restraints”, written with Claire Cham-
bolle and published in 2005 in the Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial
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Organization, we analyze the impact of the ban, such as it is formulated in the
French law, on the vertical relationships between a monopolist producer and its
two differentiated retailers. We model the negotiations between producers and re-
tailers in a way that tries to come as close as possible to the real conditions in the
French market: We assume that the producer has to publish a non-discriminatory
unit wholesale price before secretly bargaining with the retailers over rebates that
are excluded from the price threshold. Retailers then set final prices. In that
framework, we highlight an adverse effect of the ban, by showing that it allows a
producer to indirectly impose a price-floor to his retailers – a restriction prohibited
by most competition laws in Europe as well as in the United States. We show that
this effect may lead to higher retail prices whenever the retailers’ bargaining power
is high. Furthermore, the ban’s adverse effect on prices appears even in situations
where there would not necessarily be below-cost pricing in equilibrium without the
legal constraint (the retailers net margin is positive): this clearly supports the use
of a rule of reason rather than a per se ban of below-cost pricing by retailers.
In that simple framework, the effect of the ban on retail prices is determined
by two conflicting forces. First, a price-floor suppresses the effect of downstream
competition, that tends to drive prices down. Second, in the absence of price
restriction, double marginalization drives prices up, all the more so when the pro-
ducer has a higher bargaining power as he takes then a higher margin: When the
retailers have all the bargaining power, the producer gets zero margin ; When by
contrast the producer has all bargaining power in the negotiation, the retailers can
still set strictly positive margins after the wholesale negotiation, and get positive
profit. The double margin inefficiency, and thereby final prices, thus increase in
the producer’s bargaining power. Overall, when the supplier’s bargaining power is
moderate, the second effect is dominated by the first: competition leads retailers
to set prices at sub-optimal levels. It is then profitable for the supplier to use the
price-floor in order to increase final prices up to the industry profit-maximizing
level. By contrast, when the supplier’s bargaining power is high enough, uncon-
strained final prices are rather too high because of double marginalization. The
producer would need a price-ceiling to reduce final prices: a price-floor is thus
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ineffective and does not affect the final equilibrium prices. Finally, we show that
the ban unambiguously decreases consumers’ surplus and welfare.
Several decisions by the French competition authority show that such a mech-
anism has been widely used to suppress competition between retailers (see e.g.
Conseil de la Concurrence, 2003, on the market for calculators, 2005 on the mar-
ket for videotapes, and 2007 (b) on the sector of toy distribution). In these cases,
upstream and downstream firms have been found guilty of having used falsely con-
ditional rebates to set artificially high price-floors. The fact that this mechanism
has been made possible by the wording of the Galland Act is explicitly mentioned.
Empirical evidence on the overall effect of the regulation on prices is scarce (see
for instance Biscourp, Boutin and Verge´, 2008 or Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) but
consistent with our price-floor interpretation. In 2008, Claire Chambolle, Thibaud
Verge´ and I addressed these issues in a book, intended for a non-specialized reader-
ship, entitled “La loi Galland sur le commerce: Jusqu’ou` la re´former ?”, published
in the Collection Opuscule du Cepremap. In this book, we expose the adverse
effects of the Galland Act, attempt to evaluate the price increases that it caused,
and discuss several options for reform.
Several reforms have attempted to correct the adverse effect we depict. Both
the Dutreil Act (2005) and Chatel Act (2008) modified the definition of the price
threshold, into which “backroom margins” were progressively reintegrated. The
price increase was checked, but prices did not really decrease. The government
thus attempted to further reform the contractual relations between producers and
retailers, and in 2008, Claire Chambolle and I have been invited to a hearing by the
Commission Hagelsteen, which was working on these reforms. The Commission
heard a series of experts and invited us to give our opinion about whether general
terms of sales of the producers should be discriminatory. The conclusions of the
Commission Hagelsteen served as the basis for the reform of the general terms
of sales included in the “loi de modernisation de l’e´conomie” (LME), enacted in
august 2008, which repealed the requirement to offer non-discriminatory terms of
sales to all retailers.
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2.1.3 Vertical price restraints
Building on our joint work on the Galland law, presented in section 2.1.2, Claire
Chambolle and I developed a more general analysis on the welfare effect of two
vertical price restraints, namely resale price maintenance contracts (RPM) and
price-floors. In “Anticompetitive Effects of Resale-Below-Cost Laws”, published
in 2011 in International Journal of Industrial Organization, we go one step fur-
ther by modeling an industry with imperfect competition among suppliers as well
as among retailers. We consider a duopoly of producers, producing two horizon-
tally differentiated goods, which they can sell through two differentiated retailers.
Competition at both levels is in prices. We thus model interlocking relationships
in the spirit of Dobson and Waterson (2007): consumers finally choose between
four substitute goods. Again, we consider that producers first publish their general
terms of sales (that may include pricing restraints: either an industry-wide RPM
or an industry-wide price-floor) before secretly negotiating with each retailer on
wholesale tariffs (we consider both linear and two-part wholesale tariffs). Finally,
retailers set final prices. We focus on subgame-perfect Contract Equilibria in pure
strategies (Cre´mer and Riordan, 1987). We thus build a tractable setting in which
we can characterize equilibria with two-part tariffs as well as with linear tariffs,
even in the absence of pricing restrictions. In particular, this setup allows us to
bypass the difficulties highlighted by Rey and Verge´ (2010), who show the inex-
istence of pure strategy equilibria in a similar vertical structure (with imperfect
competition at both levels, interlocking relationships and take-it-or-leave it public
two-part tariff contracts offered by producers to retailers).
We show that both restraints may suppress downstream competition and dampen
upstream competition, leading to higher final prices. The main contribution of this
paper is to highlight differences between two restraints that are usually considered
as similar by antitrust authorities: our comparison of price-floor and RPM shows
that a price-floor may be more profitable for producers, lead to higher retail prices
and, in short, be worse for total welfare than a RPM. More precisely, in our
framework, while resale price maintenance may have ambiguous effect on welfare,
price-floors always harm welfare. These results hold with linear as well as two-part
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tariff contracts.
In this paper as in Allain and Chambolle (2005), retailers’ buyer power appears
as a key element in the determination of prices in the different situations. Consider
the simple case of linear wholesale tariffs. First, in the absence of price restraint
(benchmark situation), final prices increase in the producer’s bargaining power,
because producers’ margins increase. By contrast, under RPM contracts, final
prices decrease in the producers’ bargaining power: When producers have all the
bargaining power, they behave as two vertically integrated producers; retail prices
thus account for interbrand competition, but not for intrabrand competition, which
is internalized. When retailers have some bargaining power, however, they claim
a higher margin at the expense of the producers, who then increase the final price
imposed by RPM to protect their margin, at the detriment of their demand. As
a consequence, a RMP reduces final prices and improves welfare (compared to
a situation with no price restraint) whenever the producers’ bargaining power is
large enough.
Furthermore, the relative bargaining power of upstream and downstream firms
is also crucial in the difference between a price-floor and a RPM. When buyer
power is large enough, a price-floor works out as an RPM: benchmark prices are
low and the producers are better off using a price-floor to increase final prices.
By contrast, when their bargaining power is large, producers would like to set
lower prices than in the benchmark equilibrium, and a price-floor set at the RPM
level is therefore inefficient. Price-floors thus implement corner solutions that
yield higher retail prices and lower welfare than those under RPM. When retail
prices are constrained, producers extract a larger share of profit, because not being
free to choose retail prices reduces the retailers’ outside option in the bargaining.
Producers thus set price-floors above the optimal RPM level so as to ensure that
they will be binding: they receive then “a larger share of a smaller pie”. In these
cases, the price-floor is even more profitable for producers than a RPM. As a
consequence, when the producers’ bargaining power is high enough, a price-floor
is worse than a RPM in terms of final prices and welfare.
Finally, this article brings some new elements to the debate on the RPM. Both
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RPM and price-floor were banned per se in the US until the 2007 Leegin decision
by the Supreme Court (US Supreme Court, Leegin Creative Leather Products
Inc, vs. PSKS inc, 06-480, 2007/06/28), which went back on the jurisprudence
and replaced the per se ban with a rule of reason. In “The Recent Economic
Debate on the Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance”, a short article in
collaboration with Claire Chambolle, published in 2008 in Concurrences, we give
an overview of the economic debate on the pros and cons of RPM. We support
the view that RPM may on occasion have a beneficial impact on competition and
welfare. However, we argue that price-floors may be worse in terms of welfare, and
that a clear distinction should therefore be made between price-floors and RPM.
2.2 Vertical relations, investments and innovation
In a more recent set of research works, some of which still under progress, I keep
working on vertical relations and their implications in terms of competition pol-
icy, but with a specific interest in their long term effects: I focus on how the
dynamic efficiency of sectors, and specifically the firms’ incentives for investment
and innovation, is affected by competition and vertical relations.
In a first paper, in collaboration with Claire Chambolle and Patrick Rey, we
study the impact of vertical integration on the firms’ incentives to invest. A natu-
ral application is the issue of the impact of vertical integration on the incentives to
invest in an innovative process. This paper is related to ongoing research projects
that I will present in section 3. A second part of my research works in this field is
dedicated to the effect of buyer power on the efficiency of the innovation process.
In a joint work with Emeric Henry and Margaret Kyle, we analyze how competi-
tion between the potential buyers of a license may affect inefficient delays in the
signature of license contracts.
2.2.1 Vertical integration
The paper entitled “Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up”, written with
Claire Chambolle and Patrick Rey has just been conditionally accepted at The
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Review of Economic Studies. This paper deals with vertical integration, and re-
visits both the literature on hold-up and the literature on vertical foreclosure.
The literature on incomplete contracts (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975, Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978, and Grossman and Hart, 1986) has emphasized the
role of vertical integration as a possible solution to hold-up problems. In this pa-
per, we highlight instead that it can generate hold-up problems for rivals, thereby
reducing the rivals’ incentives to invest. To explore this issue, we introduce a clas-
sic hold-up concern in an oligopolistic setup, in which two downstream competitors
must invest (in stage 1) before contracting with one of two upstream suppliers (in
stage 2). Keeping in line with the hold-up literature, we consider an incomplete
contract framework: it is not possible to contract ex ante, before investment deci-
sions are made. We consider two possible market structure: vertical separation, in
which the four firms are independent, and (partial) vertical integration, in which
one upstream and one downstream firm merge while the other two firms remain
independent.
Despite the lack of ex ante contracting, under vertical separation the compe-
tition among suppliers eliminates any risk of hold-up, and firms obtain ex post
the full return from their investments. By contrast, we show that vertical integra-
tion creates hold-up concerns for the downstream rival, by affecting the integrated
supplier’s incentives from both ex ante and ex post standpoints.
To see how vertical integration may generate ex ante incentives to create hold-
up concerns for independent rivals, we consider first a simple model in which,
provided that she invests and obtains support from a supplier, a downstream firm
obtains a profit that decreases in her rival’s investment. We allow here suppliers,
if they wish so, to commit themselves ex ante, before investment decisions (that is,
in stage 0), to leaving no more than a given share of profits to their downstream
customers - in other words, we allow them to commit ex ante to being “greedy”.
In practice, this commitment can for instance be achieved by delegating decision
powers to appropriate third parties. For instance, in information and communica-
tions technology industries, some firms delegate the monetization of their patent
portfolios to Patent Assertion Entities, or “patent trolls”, who have built a repu-
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tation of being particularly aggressive and engaging in economic rent-seeking, at
the expense of patent users.
Independent suppliers never make such a commitment, as this gives them a
competitive disadvantage in the competition stage. However, committing to being
“greedy” allows a vertically integrated firm to ensure that his upstream competitor
will have an increased market power, and will be able to extract a higher part of the
independent downstream firm’s profit. Anticipating the hold-up, the independent
downstream firm reduces her investment, to the benefit of the integrated firm.
Finally, similar insights apply when suppliers can threaten to dissipate, rather
than appropriate, part of their customers’ investment benefits.
In a second step, we show that, even in the absence of any pre-commitment,
vertical integration can raise hold-up concerns when the quality of the support
is not verifiable: Vertical integration alone may then suffice to alter a supplier’s
ex post incentive to degrade the support provided to a downstream rival, thus
exposing the rival to being held-up by the other supplier. This is the case when-
ever degrading the support provided to one firm directly benefits the rival firm
but reduces total industry profit. The fear of ex post quality degradation was for
instance at the core of the discussions surrounding the 2008 merger between Tom-
Tom, the leading manufacturer of portable navigation devices, and Tele Atlas, one
of the two main providers of digital map databases in Europe and North America,
where TomTom’s rivals were concerned that the merged entity would provide them
with map databases of lower quality, preventing them from effectively competing
with TomTom. Quality degradation could also involve the abuse of commercially
sensitive information.
To see this, we exclude any pre-commitment possibility (we thus suppress stage
0), and we suppose instead that suppliers choose ex post the quality of their sup-
port, which is unverifiable and thus cannot be contracted upon. In this framework,
an independent supplier will not benefit from degrading the support he provides.
By contrast, a vertically integrated firm has an incentive to degrade the quality
supplied to the independent rival, so as to increase the profit of its downstream
subsidiary- to do so, he is even ready to offer a negative tariff to the independent
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downstream firm. As a result, which supplier wins the competition depends on
whether degrading the support increases or reduces total industry profit. When
degrading the support provided to the independent downstream firm reduces total
industry profit, the independent supplier not only wins the competition, but is able
to charge a supra-competitive tariff for its support: the independent downstream
firm is thus held up. Anticipating this, the independent downstream firm reduces
her investment in stage 1, to the benefit of the integrated firm.
We thus show that vertical integration may create hold-up problems for the
independent downstream rival, by increasing the market power of the alternative
supplier. This insight is robust in many respects. It extends for instance to
partial vertical integration, that is, when one firm acquires a stake (of less than
100%) in the other. We also show that the mechanism holds in the presence of
several independent upstream firms, as long as degrading the perceived quality of
the integrated supplier confers greater market power to the other suppliers. The
analysis also applies (“upside-down”) when the upstream firms are the ones that
are subject to hold-up. Finally, we explore the possibilities of counter-fighting
strategies by the independent rivals, who may have incentives to merge too. We
discuss conditions for a second merger not to be profitable.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on foreclosure (see Rey and
Tirole, 2007, for an overview of this literature), and in particular to the seminal
paper by Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), which has highlighted the impact of
vertical integration on product market competition through “raising rivals’ costs”
effects. We revisit this literature by focussing on hold-up and investment incen-
tives, rather than on product market competition. Moreover, as stressed by Hart
and Tirole (1990), the “raising rivals’ costs” argument relies on inefficient pricing
(namely, linear tariffs), even ex post ; otherwise suppliers’ market power would af-
fect the division of profits, but marginal input prices would still reflect (marginal)
costs, as independent suppliers have no incentives to make their customers less
competitive. By contrast, here hold-up problems alter rivals’ investment incen-
tives despite efficient ex post contracting. In addition, we further show that, in
contrast with this literature, vertical foreclosure can arise even in the absence of
24 Research summary
any pre-commitment to denying or degrading access. Vertical integration alone
triggers incentives to degrade them, even ex post, whenever doing so brings direct
benefits to the downstream subsidiary. As long as degrading access reduces total
industry profits, the threat of such degradation exposes independent rivals to being
held-up (by the other suppliers), thereby generating foreclosure.
2.2.2 Buyer power and inefficiencies in the market for licenses
I started working on another issue related to the long term effects of vertical
relations during my post-doc at London Business School. About the end of my
visit, I met Emeric Henry, who had then just been hired as an assistant professor
at LBS. We started a theoretical research project to investigate whether buyer
power could influence the timing at which an innovation was licensed, and thereby
the efficiency of the innovation process. Margaret Kyle then joined the team
and addressed this issue empirically. This work resulted in a joint paper entitled
“Inefficiencies in Technology Transfer: Theory and Empirics”, which has recently
been accepted for publication in Management Science.
Specialization in different phases of the innovative process is facilitated by
the growth of licensing markets. This division of labour potentially improves the
efficiency of the innovative process. We argue in this paper that these efficiency
gains crucially depend on the timing of exchange, by which we mean the phase of
development at which an innovative project is transferred from one firm to another.
Among firms involved in a R&D process, some are more efficient in conducting
early stage research (R) and others more efficient in the final stage of product
development (D). It is socially optimal to have the relatively efficient firm own the
project at each stage, i.e. to transfer the project at the right phase of development.
However, imperfect information on the quality of the innovation may distort the
timing of the transfer. We consider several scenarios of imperfect information:
Our baseline model assumes seller overconfidence, and we show that assuming
asymmetric information between seller and buyers leads to similar results. We
analyze the effect of competition between the potential buyers of a license, hence
of buyer power, on this timing, and thus on the efficiency of the innovation process,
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when buyers and sellers of licenses have imperfect information about the value of
innovation.
We first present new empirical evidence from pharmaceutical licensing that
suggests a relationship between market structure and delays in the sale of ideas or
projects. The pharmaceutical industry provides a case in point as drug develop-
ment involves several distinct phases which are clearly defined and controlled by
regulatory agencies: Typically, the discovery phase is followed by the preclinical
phase, during which the drug candidates are tested on animals; at this point, clin-
ical trials in humans begin. Clinical trials are split into three additional phases.
Going from one phase to the next requires approval from a regulatory agency:
Verifiable evidence of a drug candidate’s quality is thus produced at each phase.
Furthermore, in this industry we observe a fact that motivates our research: the
fraction of licensing contracts signed after the discovery and preclinical stages has
increased by more than 30% between 1990 and 2007. This shift coincides with
a period of increased market concentration, as the pharmaceutical industry has
undergone substantial consolidation.
Our data contains detailed information on all licensing deals in the pharmaceu-
tical industry signed since 1973, including financial details and information about
the geographical region covered by the license and about the type of contract (mar-
keting, production, research). Finally, it records the phase of development of the
drug at the time the license was signed. We combine these with data on potential
buyers, who compete on the product market as well as for the license. Control-
ling for various measures of financial constraints and other factors, we provide
empirical evidence that there is a relationship between downstream competition
and licensing delay. Specifically we show that an increase in the number of buyers
has a non-monotonic effect on licensing delays: Downstream competition appears
to have an inverted U-shaped effect on the timing of licensing. Furthermore, an
increase in the number of entrants in the disease market delays licensing while an
increase in the number of incumbents reduces delays.
This evidence motivates our theoretical analysis. We develop a class of theoret-
ical models that link market structure and the timing of licensing. We consider one
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innovator with a pre-existing innovation, who may license it to one of n potential
buyers who will develop the project and, if it succeeds, market the product. The
license is sold by running an auction. It grants the full ownership of the innovation
to the buyer. The innovator does not have the resources necessary to fully develop
the innovation, but she can choose to run an auction in the first period or to do
so after incurring additional development costs, in the second period. Developing
the project from the first to the second period is costless for the buyers: It is thus
socially optimal to transfer the project from the innovator to one of the buyers
in the first period. However, the value of the innovation is uncertain before de-
velopment (in period 1), but the development efforts reveal verifiable information
that resolves all uncertainty about the project’s value (in period 2). Our baseline
model assumes that, in period 1, the seller is overconfident: she assigns a higher
probability that the project is good than the buyers.
In that framework, we show that market structure affects the timing of the
transfer. If the payoffs on the market do not depend on the number of potential
buyers, the condition for early licensing is harder to meet as the number of buyers
increases. However, if the number of potential buyers negatively affects the profits,
the effect of a change in the number of competitors is more subtle. There are two
countervailing effects of n on the price the innovator can extract. On the one hand,
it raises the “bargaining power” of the innovator, since there is a higher chance
that one bidder has a low implementation cost. On the other hand, it decreases the
actual profits derived from the innovation, since profits are a decreasing function
of n. The tension between these two effects yields an ambiguous effect of n on the
price in the auction and thus on the timing of licensing.
We then introduce an additional source of buyer heterogeneity, assuming that
some potential buyers, the “incumbents”, are active in the same class as the li-
censed innovation, while others, the “entrants”, are not currently active on the
downstream market. The number of entrants thus plays a role in the bargaining
power of the seller, but it does not affect the profits in the same way, as in fine at
most one entrant enters. The first result states that an increase in the number of
potential entrants unambiguously delays licensing. By contrast, delay is likely to
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decrease with the number of incumbents.
We finally discuss what alternative assumptions yield similar predictions, and
we define a common thread for those models that predict the patterns highlighted
in the empirical study. We then explore other plausible assumptions. For example,
the seller might be better informed about the quality of the project or about
some characteristic of the market, such as the number of buyers competing for
the purchase. The buyer and seller may also have different risk profiles. Any of
these assumptions yield the same qualitative result for the relationship between
the efficiency of markets for technology and competition.
Though our model is not specifically designed to analyze the issue of mergers,
our results suggest some implications for competition policy. In particular, merger
reviews in highly technological areas should consider this additional effect of the
merger on upstream licensing markets. The pharmaceutical industry has under-
gone significant consolidation in recent decades, particularly between the large
multinationals that are the typical buyers of licenses. In addition, there is much
concern regarding a slowdown of innovation in this industry that the widespread
use of licensing has failed to reverse. This paper highlights some frictions in licens-
ing and the role of competition that may at least partially explain these patterns.
2.3 Coordination and Competition Policy
The last part of my research works deals with competition policy issues related to
“alliances” between firms, in other words, by the way competition is affected by
some kind of cooperation between competitors. These issues are structured around
two main research areas: cartels and mergers.
I started working on cartel deterrence in 2010 as I wrote a report, with Jean-
Pierre Ponssard and Marcel Boyer, about cartel deterrence. In this report, we
discussed the actual methods of cartel deterrence by competition authorities, and
the assessment of social damages caused by cartels - we focused on the estimation
of cartel overcharge. We then reviewed the economic literature on cartel fines,
with the aim of defining the “appropriate” level of fines. Participating to this
report gave me the opportunity to become more familiar with the issue of cartel
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deterrence, and introduced me to the economic analysis of crime. I will present
two papers on this topic.
The second part gathers several research works related to mergers, a topic on
which I started working during my PhD. I will first present a theoretical analysis
of mergers in vertically related industries, followed by an empirical paper that
presents a retrospective analysis of a merger in the retail sector. In both cases, I
consider the implications for merger control.
2.3.1 Cartel deterrence
Preventing the formation of cartels and stopping the active ones is a major objec-
tive of competition policy. Though some countries have adopted criminal sanctions
against individuals who engaged in cartels (including the United States and a few
countries within Europe), antitrust authorities rely mainly on financial penalties
to enforce laws against cartels. Properly setting the amount of the fine for each
convicted cartel is thus an important issue, as the fine is the main tool of antitrust
authorities to achieve their objectives of deterrence and compensation.
A few recent articles have tried to investigate whether in practice fines are set
adequately, and especially whether they are sufficient to be deterrent. Connor
(2010) uses a large database of international cartels to study cartel overcharges,
and concludes that “...penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels ought
to be increased”. However, Connor (2011) acknowledges that, following the 2006
Guidelines, the fines imposed by the European Commission have dramatically
increased : “The new Guidelines produced hard-core cartel fines that were more
than six times as severe as comparable fines imposed under the 1998 Guidelines”.
This makes recent fines more in line with their objectives: “For the first time
in antitrust history, I believe we are observing fines that regularly disgorge the
monopoly profits accumulated by cartelists”. Combe and Monnier (2011) consider
64 prosecuted cartel cases in the European Union. They define and compute
optimal fine benchmarks, which they compare to the actual fines inflicted to the
cartels they consider. From their theoretical analysis and empirical estimates,
they conclude that “fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission
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are overall sub-optimal”.
Two articles in collaboration with Jean-Pierre Ponssard, Marcel Boyer, and
Rachidi Kotchoni contribute to this literature. In a first article written with Mar-
cel Boyer and Jean-Pierre Ponssard, and published in 2011 in Concurrences, we
discuss the general methodology used to estimate the cartel overcharge (that is,
the difference between the cartel price and the price that would prevail in the ab-
sence of the cartel), and especially the choice of the counterfactual scenario. We
then discuss how to determine the optimal level of fines in cartel cases in view of
the objectives of deterrence and compensation.
The economic theory of deterrence of criminal activities proceeds from the
seminal works by Becker (1968) and Landes (1983). This approach considers the
incentives of firms to engage in illicit activities: to ensure deterrence, the expected
fine should be high enough to wipe out any expected profit from the participation
in the cartel. More precisely, a firm is deterred from participating in a cartel if the
expected excess profit (caused by cartel behavior) is lower than the expected loss,
which equals the fine times the probability of being discovered and convicted. For
a given probability of detection, this approach defines a lower bound such that any
fine above this benchmark will be deterrent.
Another objective of the punishment of criminal activities is to achieve the
reparation of the harm that these activities have caused to society. To make
sure a fine is in line with the value of the harm caused, one would need to base
fines on a precise estimation of social damages. Yet measuring social damages,
especially consumer welfare losses, is a demanding exercise that requires a pre-
cise case-by-case analysis, which is too costly to be systematically conducted by
antitrust authorities (See OXERA, 2009). We therefore follow a “second-best” ap-
proach, in an attempt to provide a simple benchmark that can be computed from
available public data. We thus deem as “compensatory” any fine such that the
illicit profit of the cartel is seized back. This defines a benchmark fine satisfying
the compensation objective.
These two objectives define two lower bounds: any fine above the maximum
of these bounds will thus satisfy both objectives. However, setting too high a fine
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may be inefficient: it may induce social costs. First, large fines may violate prin-
ciples of proportional justice. Second, they may force companies into bankruptcy.
Wils (2006) warns that bankruptcy entails costs on innocent stakeholders: it would
“hurt not only managers and shareholders, on whom the bankruptcy may be con-
sidered to have a desirable deterrent effect, but also all other stakeholders in the
firm: employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and tax authorities.” These con-
siderations have driven antitrust authorities in Europe and in the US to take into
account the ability to pay of the convicted firms when they set fines. Finally, set-
ting too high a fine may paradoxically decrease deterrence, as stated by Andreoni
(1991) in the case of criminal activities: if the jurors decide whether to convict an
individual by weighing the costs associated with false acquittals and false convic-
tions, as the cost of false conviction increases in sanctions, higher sanctions may
lead jurors to convict less frequently. We therefore claim that the optimal fine is
the maximum of the two lower bounds.
In “Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European
Union”, written with Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard
and published in 2015 in the International Review of Law and Economics, we go
further by using an extensive analysis of EC fines over the period 2005-2012 to
assess whether recent EC-imposed firm level fines satisfy the deterrence and/or
compensation benchmark. We first consider a simple dynamic model of cartel
along the lines of Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) to define the benchmark fine
for the deterrence objective. We consider that firms interact in an infinitely re-
peated game. In each period, they must first communicate before setting prices,
and communication is a necessary condition for the cartel to exist. For each firm
participating in the cartel, we define the deterrence benchmark fine as a function
of the annual excess profit (that is, the difference between the profit in the cartel
and the profit under competition) and of the annual probability of detection by
antitrust authorities. Furthermore, we simply define the compensation benchmark
as the annual excess profit multiplied by the number of years of cartel activity.
We then follow a method developed by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) that
requires parsimonious information on market conditions to assess cartel excess
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profits as a function of each firm’s annual sales and three parameters: the price-
elasticity of demand, the but-for competitive markup (that is, the markup that
would prevail in the absence of the cartel), and the cartel overcharge.
We build a database of all cartels fined by the European Commission over
the period 2005-2012. During this period, the European Commission fined 325
firms for their participation in 49 cartels. As the EC does not publish all data
for confidentiality reasons, we have workable data for slightly less than half the
firms, and our sample covers a wide range of sectors. The data recovered are: the
duration of infringement, the size of the firm’s annual sales in the relevant markets,
and the level of the fine1. As for the but-for price, the probability of detection,
and the price-elasticity of demand, we base our analysis on several reasonable
representative scenarios corroborated by the empirical literature.
We then compute the two benchmark fines in the different scenarios and com-
pare those to the actual level of the fine imposed the European Commission. For
instance, assuming that the annual probability of detection is 15% and the price-
elasticity of demand is -1, the share of actual fines above the deterrence benchmark
varies according to the scenarios from 28% in a scenario with powerful cartels in a
very competitive industry (with a cartel overcharge of 30% and a but-for markup
of 5%) to 89% in a scenario with much weaker cartels in a less competitive sector
(with a cartel overcharge of 50% and a but-for markup of 20%). Similarly, with the
same assumptions regarding the probability of detection and the price-elasticity of
demands, the share of fines above the restitution benchmark varies from 43% for a
5% but-for markup and a 30% cartel overcharge, to 95% for a 5% cartel overcharge
(irrespective of the markup). Overall, we find on average a higher proportion of
fines above the two benchmarks than Combe and Monnier: this comes partly from
the definition of our deterrence benchmark in a dynamic setting, and partly be-
cause our data select more recent cartels. These empirical results could indicate
that recent fines are closer to their deterrence and compensation objectives than
they were in the past. However, a striking feature of our results is the dispersion
of the fines : some seem to be too high, while others are much too low. This calls
1We use the level before mitigating and aggravating factors and before leniency reductions.
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for further research on the optimal way to design fines.
2.3.2 Horizontal mergers
The preventive control of mergers is a central activity of competition authorities,
and perhaps their main tool for the control of market structures. In Europe, since
the 1989 Merger Regulation 4064/89, all firms (above a given turnover) have to
notify their merger projects and receive the authorization from the competition
authorities. Competition authorities base their decisions on the assessment of pos-
sible effects on competition and welfare. According to the European Guidelines
on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the con-
trol of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), “Through its control
of mergers, the Commission prevents mergers that would be likely to deprive cus-
tomers of [the benefits of competition] by significantly increasing the market power
of firms. By ”increased market power” is meant the ability of one or more firms to
profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services,
diminish innovation, or otherwise influence parameters of competition.” In this
section I present several contributions to the economic analysis of mergers.
A merger influences competition not only in the industry in which it occurs,
but also in vertically related sectors: It may influence the market conditions in
these sectors, for instance through the costs or the demand function, and even
the market structure, for instance by affecting the incentives to merge in these
sectors. Although this indirect effect is important for competition policy, very
little literature has been devoted to assessing its impact. In the E.U. and the
U.S., Competition Authorities generally consider a merger as less harmful when
the demand stems from sufficiently concentrated firms: the underlying idea is that
buyers’ market power will translate into bargaining power towards their suppliers.
A stream of literature has developed this theme since the seminal work of Galbraith
(1952). However, a more detailed analysis of the effect of the vertical position of
firms on their incentives to merge and on the welfare consequences of mergers is
necessary.
I started investigating this question during my PhD, in collaboration with Sa¨ıd
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Souam. We continued working on this topic after my PhD and published in 2006
in Annales d’Economie et de Statistique a first article entitled “Concentrations
horizontales et relations verticales”. In this article, we provide a theoretical analy-
sis of horizontal mergers in vertically related sectors, focusing on the link between
concentration in the two sectors and the sharing of profits between upstream and
downstream firms. We consider a model of successive Cournot duopolies, with
quadratic costs that depend on the firm’s capital investment – this cost structure
follows McAfee and Williams (1992) and allows us to take into account size effects
created by a merger. In this setting we compare the profitability of mergers in the
two sectors. We show that, everything else being equal, mergers tend to be more
profitable downstream than upstream. This result contrasts with Ziss (2005), who
shows in a similar framework, but without size effects, that, when the upstream
marginal cost and the degree of concavity of final demand are constant, the prof-
itability of a horizontal merger is the same, everything else being equal, in both
sectors. Furthermore, the losses caused by a merger in the upstream sector to
downstream firms are worse than the losses incurred by upstream firms due to a
merger downstream. As a consequence, even though mergers are more profitable
downstream than upstream, they may be more harmful to welfare when they occur
among upstream firms. We also show that increasing concentration in one sector
reduces the profitability of mergers in the other sector.
A second article in collaboration with Sa¨ıd Souam, entitled “A Note on hori-
zontal mergers in vertically related industries” and published in 2011 in Economics
Bulletin, attempts to generalize some of the results obtained in the first article.
We build a tractable model of successive Cournot oligopolies with an elastic input
supply function in the upstream market and an elastic final demand function. Our
first contribution is to compare the profitability of mergers in the two sectors. We
characterize conditions on the concavity of the input supply function and of the
final demand function such that, everything else being equal, an upstream merger
may be more profitable than a downstream merger. Our second contribution con-
sists in analyzing the impact of a merger in one industry on the joint profit in the
other industry in a framework where the input supply function is elastic, with con-
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stant degree of concavity. We show that the elasticity of the input supply function
may lead upstream losses to become worse than downstream losses. Finally, we
discuss these mechanisms when the two degrees of concavity are not constant, and
we sketch a welfare analysis.
The application we had in mind while starting these researches was the issue
of mergers among retailers, especially whether these are as likely to be welfare-
decreasing as mergers among suppliers. A theoretical analysis sheds some light
on this issue, but I was soon convinced that an empirical investigation would be
useful, especially in a context of growing retail concentration. In fact, over the
last thirty years, successive merger waves have dramatically increased food retail
sector concentration in most western economies. In 2000, in the US, the largest
five retail groups realized close to one third of total food sales. In Europe, the
highest concentration ratios are reached in the northern European countries, but
the retail sector is rather concentrated in most countries in western Europe.2 Yet
supermarket mergers are a particularly important issue for antitrust authorities
because food expenditures represent a large share of household budget - about
13% on average in European countries in 2012.3 Large price variations due to a
retail merger may thus cause a large impact on consumer surplus.
In 1999, Claire Chambolle and I had been invited by the French Antitrust
Authority (Conseil de la Concurrence) to present a survey on the welfare conse-
quences of retail mergers to the members of the Conseil. Our main conclusions
were that two particular features of the retail sector, namely the local dimension
of competition and the existence of buyer power, make the antitrust analysis of a
merger in the retail sector more complex than a merger between producers. First,
because supermarkets compete at the local level, the effects of a merger have to
be analyzed for each local relevant market. Second, as in any sector, a merger be-
tween retailers reduces competition, which tends to increase prices; this effect can
however be balanced by possible efficiency gains due to synergies. A third effect,
which is specific to the retail sector, is the possible gains induced by buyer power.
2According to Einarsson (2011), in 2004, the total market share for the largest three retailers
(CR3) was above 79% in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
3Source: Eurostat.
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Indeed, the merged retailer is likely to obtain better terms and conditions from
its suppliers, and to pass on part of this cost reduction to consumers. Increased
buyer power can thus lead to a welfare-enhancing reduction in final prices. This
effect is specific to the vertical structure of the retail industry, which explains why
competition authorities may be more prone to clear mergers in the retail industry
than in other sectors. For instance, among the 99 retail mergers proposed between
1990 and 2012 to the European Commission, 89 were approved, 8 were approved
subject to conditions, and only 2 were rejected.4
The opportunity to start working on an empirical analysis of a retail merger was
given by the exceptional database purchased by INRA, which gave us access to data
on food purchases by a consumer panel representative of the French population.
With this database, we could attempt to retrieve the impact of a large merger
among supermarket chains on prices and on consumers purchasing behavior. This
work led to a paper in collaboration with Claire Chambolle, Ste´phane Turolla and
Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, entitled “The impact of retail mergers on food prices:
evidence from France”. It is currently under revision at the Journal of Industrial
Economics. In this paper, we attempt to causally identify localized price effects
of a merger. Furthermore, we test several economic mechanisms at play behind
the price responses to a retail merger. We obtained a 9 000 US Dollars grant
in 2014 from the France-Berkeley fund, and a 2 000 Euros grant in 2013 from
CEPREMAP, to develop this project.
This paper analyzes the impact of a merger that took place in 2000 in the
French retail sector, when two of the main retail chains merged. The merged
entity then became the first chain at the national level. The EC cleared the
merger on the condition that some divestments were made. It then delegated the
decision to the French and Spanish competition authorities in order to assess the
impact of the merger on retail competition at the local level. The French CA
concluded that competition was likely to be affected in 27 local areas. However,
the remedies required were not all enforced by the French Ministry of Economics,
4For instance, in 1997, the EC prohibited the merger between two leading food retail chains
in Finland, Kesko and Tuko (see, 97/277/EC Kesko/Tuko, OJ L 110/53, 26/4/1997).
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and the merger finally received final administrative approval in May 2000.
We use the scanner data collected by TNS Worldpanel. This dataset records
food purchases from a panel of households that are representative of the geograph-
ical and socio-economic group characteristics of the French population. We have
information on prices paid and quantities purchased, all products purchased are
described by a rich set of characteristics, and households provide information about
their shopping place. We complement these data with information on retail store
characteristics over the same time period, obtained from the Panorama Traded-
imensions dataset. Lastly, we collect population and average household income
information from census surveys, to proxy for determinants of demand faced by
stores at the commune level (the French administrative unit similar to city). We
consider the period that spans 1998 to 2001, in order to avoid two sets of “shocks”
that are orthogonal to the merger ad may have influenced prices as well: first, the
Raffarin and Galland laws enacted in 1997 (and previously discussed) – so we start
in 1998 – and second, the monetary change that took place in 2002 (French Franc
disappeared as Euro was launched on january 1, 2002)– so we stop in 2001.
In order to measure the price-effect of the merger on food prices, we perform
a difference-in-differences analysis by comparing price changes at stores situated
in markets affected by the merger (treated markets) to price changes in markets
unaffected by the merger (counterfactual control markets). First, in line with the
position of the French CA, we define around each store a “local market” as the set
of hypermarkets within 20 km around the city center where the store is located,
and of all other stores within 10 km. Our baseline definition of the treatment group
is the set of stores affected by the merger either directly (i.e., stores belonging to
the merging firms, or “insiders”), or indirectly (i.e., stores not belonging to the
merging firms, that is, “outsiders”, but belonging to a local market where at least
one insider is active). Outsiders that do not compete with a store belonging to the
merging firms are included in the control group. A consequence of this definition
is that the treatment group is larger than the control group – we thus use several
methods, including a propensity score matching estimator (see Hirano et al., 2003),
to correct this potential bias.
First, even though we are unable to estimate the causal effect of the merger on
insiders, as we cannot construct a counterfactual for the insiders (by definition they
all belong to a treatment group), we find that the merger is correlated with price
increases of the merging firms: comparing prices before and after the merger shows
that prices at insider stores increased by 4 to 5%. Second, we use the difference-in-
differences method to analyze the effect of the merger on the outsiders prices. Our
results show that the approved merger affected competitors’ prices positively and
significantly, i.e. between 1.5% and 2.5%. In addition, we empirically investigate
economic forces behind the observed price changes. By decomposing this effect
even further, we show that competitor prices increase more in local markets that
experience larger structural changes. We break up the overall increase in the
outsiders’ prices and find that a change in local concentration and a drop in local
retail differentiation explain a large part of the treated outsiders’ price increase.
In contrast, isolating a pure rebranding effect, which appears in markets where
one of the merging firm rebrands after the merger, but where no store of the other
merging group operates (to avoid any local concentration effects), and where no
store of this new brand was operating before the merger (to avoid a drop in local
differentiation), does not explain significantly the treated outsiders’ price increase.
Finally, we show that our results are robust to changes in the definition of the
treatment and control group and to anticipation concerns.
In terms of competition policy, we confirm that mergers in the retail sector
must be analyzed at the local level. Two recent reports by the French Competition
authority on the retail sector express the view that retailers benefit from weak local
competitive conditions and exert significant market power in local markets (see
Conseil de la Concurrence (2007 a) and Autorite´ de la Concurrence, 2012). The
French Competition Authority even calls for the right to impose ex-post remedies
on retail groups when they are too highly concentrated in some areas, such as
Paris. We support this analysis. We plan to continue working on this issue, and I
will develop further in section 3.1.1.
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3 Research perspectives
In this section, I present my research perspectives in the short and medium term.
One of the objectives I have for the coming years is to develop empirical and
experimental methods in addition to the theoretical ones. I have a few projects
which I hope will inaturally lead me to use the methods of experimental economics.
I also wish to develop more empirical works, and if possible explore the field of
structural econometrics.
In terms of applications, I wish to further extend my researches beyond the field
of vertical relations. In what follows I will present some of my research projects.
This section is organized as follows: I will start with two projects about retail
mergers in section 3.1; in section 3.2, I will then present an experimental project
on vertical integration; then in section 3.3, I will present a project on two-sided
markets, before moving on category captains in section 3.4, and finally on cartels
in section 3.5.
3.1 Retail mergers
One of the main themes I plan to study in the short run is horizontal mergers. I
already have two on-going projects, and I hope to develop other researches on that
topic. Both on-going projects deal with mergers in the retail industry. The first
project is empirical: we plan to adopt a structural approach in order to complete
and refine our analysis of retail merger, and test the results on the data we have on
the French retail market. The second project is theoretical: in order to go further
in the analysis of mergers in the retail sector, we plan to introduce new features
in the analysis, such as the mix of local and national pricing strategies.
3.1.1 Empirical analysis
The growing economic literature that attempts to evaluate the price effect of merg-
ers relies on two main methods, and there is a lively debate between the two
approaches (see for instance Angrist and Pischke, 2010, or Nevo and Whinston,
2010). First, some papers, in the spirit of Nevo (2000), build structural models of
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demand and supply in order to simulate mergers using pre-merger data. A sec-
ond stream of empirical papers uses both pre- and post-merger data on prices to
directly estimate the effects of structural changes and mergers (such as Focarelli
and Panetta (2003) for retail banking; Hastings (2004) for retail gasoline; Basker
and Noel (2009) for retail entry and Hosken, Olson and Smith (2012) for US retail
chain mergers). Recently, Houde (2012) reconciled both approaches by conducting
both a retrospective analysis and a structural econometric simulation of a vertical
merger in the Canadian gasoline sector.
In Allain, Chambolle, Turolla and Villas-Boas (2013), we use a retrospective
methodology to analyze the price effect of a merger. In terms of policy implications,
this method allows us to criticize a decision that has been taken in the past.
However, another challenge is to predict ex ante the potential price effects at
the time when antitrust authorities are notified of a merger, in order to impose
relevant remedies and to better protect consumers. Several steps could be taken
in this direction.
Using our detailed data, we can first perform a simple prediction of how the
local concentration changes induced by the merger would affect local market retail
prices. Using our estimation of the correlation between the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index (HHI) and prices pre-merger, we perform an out-of- sample price prediction,
given the post-merger local HHI levels. We find a predicted price increase of
2.11% with the new HHI, with a standard error of 0.05%. We conclude that these
predictions, that rely on a simple method based on the variation in the local HHI
index, are rather close to the 2.5% price increase obtained in our expenditure
weighted DID specification. Hence, using the HHI as a preliminary screen for
merger analysis appears to be an attractive tool - a finding consistent with Hosken,
Olson and Smith (2012).
In order to complete and refine our analysis of retail mergers, we plan to adopt a
more structural approach. Our goal would be to simulate the effect of divestitures
with a theoretical model and calibrate the model with our data. Smith (2004)
measures market power firms derive by internalizing cross-effects between stores
in their chain. He then uses the model to predict the effects of demergers in the
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UK retail sector, by calculating the profit margins that individual stores would set
if they operated independently of other stores with the same firm. We could build
on his approach to construct our model and incorporate new features.
An important difference would come from the variety of the pricing strategies of
the French retail chains. In Allain et al (2013), we point out that the French retail
chains have very different strategies. More precisely, we use our data in the pre-
merger period to relate prices at the group level (each retail group is composed of
several retail chains) to variables controlling for local market conditions, including
the level of concentration in local markets (measured by the HHI). This analysis
reveals that, though no chain has a pure national pricing strategy, as pure within-
chain price dispersion measures are not zero for any of the retail chains, one of the
merging chains, say, M1, tends to respond less than the others to local competitive
factors: M1 is closer to having a national pricing strategy. We claim that these
strategies have different impacts on the price effect of mergers. We therefore would
like to understand better the impact of retailers pricing strategy on retail mergers.
A theoretical project in collaboration with Claire Chambolle and Ste´phane Turolla
deals with this issue.
3.1.2 Theoretical analysis
It has been well documented by consumers’ associations that retailers distort their
offers locally, mainly by adopting local pricing policies. Local pricing strategies
have been reported in Spain (see e.g. Asensio, 2014), or in the US (see Ellickson
and Misra, 2008). In France, Biscourp, Boutin and Verge´ (2013) show that price
decisions in the French retail sector are partly made at the national level and
partly at the store level. Similarly, in Austria, Pennerstorfer and Sinabell (2013)
show that some retailers “seem to regionally differentiate prices extensively”. This
contrasts with the pricing strategy of the main retail chains in the UK, where
uniform pricing at the national level prevails. In 2004 for instance, the main British
retail chains (Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s, and Morrisons) made a public commitment
to uniform national pricing in the newspapers. Asda stated that “Asda pricing
does not discriminate by geography, store size or level of affluence - we have one
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Asda price across the entire country”. Taking this dimension into account could
enhance the analysis of the welfare effects of mergers.
There is a large literature on retail pricing strategies. Some empirical papers,
in the marketing literature for instance, as Ellickson and Misra (2008), observe the
pricing strategies chosen by the retail firms and reveal their variety. They stress
the importance of local demand factors in the determination of these strategies.
Similarly, Chintagunta, Dube and Singh (2003) and Li, Gordon and Netzer (2013)
compare the profitability of different strategies when several retail chains compete
on several markets. However, few papers model the pricing strategies of multi-
outlets chains operating different stores in different local markets. Dobson and
Waterson (2005) endogenize the chains’ choice of the pricing strategy (local or
uniform). They provide a theoretical framework explaining why, under certain
local market conditions, national retail chains are better off setting uniform prices:
They show that, in some cases, local pricing may not be the optimal strategy.
However, none of these papers studies the way such a choice may impact the
welfare consequences of a merger.
In this project, we plan to go one step further by investigating how the welfare
effects of a merger in the retail sector may vary according to the choice of the pric-
ing strategy. In a first contribution, presented in january 2015 at the workshop
“Regards croise´s en Economie et Politique de la Concurrence” in Paris, and cur-
rently submitted to a special issue of the Revue Economique, we present a simple
model to analyze this issue. We focus on two polar cases: purely national (“uni-
form pricing”) or purely local pricing strategy. We consider two local markets A
and B, each of them being modeled as a Salop circle on which three stores compete:
1, 2 and 3 on market A, and 1,3 and 4 on market B. We consider the effect of the
merger between 1 (who is present on the two local markets) and 2 (who is present
only on market A).
In the benchmark situation, all firms adopt a local pricing strategy. In that
case, after the merger, prices increase (and the welfare decreases) only in market
A, and market B is not affected, in the sense that the merger does not change
concentration in this market (as at least one of the merging groups operates no
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store there). However, our first results show that, when a retailer (either an insider
or an outsider) adopts a uniform pricing strategy, the price increase on markets
affected by the merger spreads to markets “unaffected” by the merger. This calls
for a redefinition of the relevant market in the case of a merger in the retail sector.
However, this propagation effect can be counterbalanced by a reduction of the
price increase in the local areas affected by the merger (here, the market A), but
only if the unaffected market is sufficiently competitive compared to the affected
market. We plan to build on these first results to develop the insights in a more
general framework. In particular, we want to compare the welfare effects of the
merger on the two markets depending on which chain adopts a national pricing
strategy (an insider or an outsider). We also want to endogenize the choice of
the pricing strategy by the merging firms after the merger, and to investigate
whether antitrust authorities should consider that a merger is more likely to be
anticompetitive if the firms adopt a uniform pricing strategy, and whether they
should impose a change in the pricing strategy as remedies.
3.2 Vertical integration: an experimental perspective
In Allain, Chambolle and Rey (2014) we have highlighted that, when competition
prevails in two vertically related sectors, vertical integration can generate hold-up
problems for rivals, thereby reducing the rivals’ incentives to invest. We plan to
further develop this analysis by testing whether the conclusions of our theoretical
analysis appear in an experimental setting.
Due to a lack in field data, empirical investigations on hold-up inefficiencies
rely mostly on laboratory experiments. For instance, Ellingsen and Johannesson
have conducted a hold-up experiment in which unilateral investment is followed
by bilateral bargaining. They show that without communication, investment is
low, and that unilateral communication facilitates coordination. However, most
studies test whether hold-up arises in a bilateral bargaining setting, in which two
players have to share the return on one’s sunk investment. As we highlight in
our theoretical paper, taking into account competition upstream and downstream
modifies the conditions of emergence of the hold-up externality, and may even
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reverse the findings.
Furthermore, we have seen that our theoretical results also relate to the litera-
ture on foreclosure. Experimental testing of the “raising rivals’ costs” mechanism
highlighted by OSS has been performed by Normann (2011) and Martin et al.
(2001), who explore the emergence of foreclosure in an experimental setting. We
build on their analysis to develop our experimental method.
We plan to run an experiment in order to test whether hold-up arises in a
framework with upstream and downstream competition. We have already written
the protocol, and run the “pilot” experiment. We hope to go on with several
treatments before the end of the year. We are going to study two setups, in
order to see whether we replicate our analysis both from an ex ante and an ex
post perspectives. The first one replicates the “simple model” presented in Allain,
Chambolle and Rey (2014), section 2.1, in which hold-up relies on the possibility
for upstream firms to pre-commit ex ante to being “greedy” and leave no more
than a given sharing rule to their customers. The second test relies on the more
elaborated model with unverifiable quality developed in section 3.1, in which hold-
up relies on the possibility for upstream firms to degrade ex post the quality of the
support they provide to their customers. Each of these models will constitute a
“treatment”, while a third treatment will consist in playing the benchmark game
without pre-commitment, and without possible quality degradation.
In each session, we play one treatment ten times without integration (phase 1),
and ten times with integration (phase 2). Thirty players are active in each session:
twenty play the role of the two upstream firms (10 play the role of UA and 10 others
UB), and ten play the downstream firm D2. The fourth player in our model, D1, is
a non-strategic player whose behavior is determined by a program. We therefore
focus on the two upstream competitors (the ones who take the decisions to hold-
up their customers or not) and on the reaction of the independent downstream
firm, D2. In each session, a role (UA, UB or D2) is first attributed to the players.
This role is fixed for the entire course of the experiment. Then the game is played
ten times in phase 1. At each time, the players are matched. Matching between
players UA and UB follows the “perfect strangers” protocol, that is, each player
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UA meets at most once each player UB. By contrast, players D2 are randomly
matched with a pair UA − UB at each time.
Our experiment will take place at Ecole Polytechnique between may and de-
cember 2015. Both Polytechnique Students and employees from the administra-
tion will participate to the experiment. At the end of each session, one of the
twenty treatments will be drawn randomly, and the subjects’ monetary earnings
will equal their payoffs in this session. To finance this project, we obtained credits
from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) and the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft (DFG) for the French-German cooperation project “Competition and
Bargaining in Vertical Chains,” from the European Research Council under the
Grant Agreement no. 340903, and from Labex Ecodec Investissements d’Avenir
(ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047).
3.3 Vertical restraints in two-sided markets
The Internet technology and the web economy create new types of markets and
new relationships between market players. The majority of these new markets
can be associated to platforms where two sides of the same market meet. Such
“two-sided” industries raise specific issues of competition policy. Since november
2014, I started supervising a PhD student, Thomas Larrieu, in collaboration with
Philippe Fe´vrier. Thomas is working on these issues, and benefits from a “CIFRE”
convention: he works part time at the Economics Department in Ecole Polytech-
nique, and part-time at two closely related consulting firms, MAPP (a consulting
firm that offers microeconomic analysis services with a focus on competition is-
sues) and Veltys (a “sister company” specialized in micro-econometric analysis,
and more generally in data management).
Applying the standard tools of competition policy to two-sided markets can be
misleading, especially as the competitive pricing strategies of two-sided platforms
can be difficult to read: platforms can abuse their dominant position by setting
their prices too low (predatory pricing) or too high (excessive pricing). Given the
typical pricing structures of two-sided platforms, it is possible to find excessive
pricing on one side and predatory on the other side, even though the platform
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remains competitive overall. Indeed, it may be privately and socially optimal to
price one side of the market below costs when the other side of the market is the
one where the platform earns revenues. In such a framework, specific contractual
clauses may have unexpected effects, and Thomas Larrieu plans to explore these
issues in his PhD.
We have a project in collaboration that focuses on most-favoured-nation (hence-
forth MFN) clauses. MFN clauses are contract provisions in which a seller agrees
to give the buyer the best terms (e.g., price) it makes available to any other buyer.
In theory, the impact of MFN clause is ambiguous: although there is some con-
cern that MFN may restrict competition and harm consumers, potential benefits
can also be pointed out. For instance, MFN can be used to prevent free-riding,
or opportunism in situations where one of the parties makes relationship-specific
investments. Platform MFN agreements in particular have played a key role in
recent antitrust cases involving credit cards, ebooks, and health-care networks (see
Salop and Scott Morton, 2013).
A case in point is provided by online hotel booking platforms. In several
countries, competition authorities are currently investigating MFN clauses in dis-
tribution contracts in this sector. Booking platforms are two-sided, as they offer
an intermediation service to consumers and hotels. Typically, platforms charge a
fee to the hotel when a room is sold on their website. Knowing these fees, the
hotels decide on which platform to be listed, which quantity (number of rooms)
they offer on each platform they are listed on, and at which price. Finally, con-
sumers select one or several platforms, and book hotels. In the present case, under
a MFN regime, the hotels affiliated to a platform are contractually bound to offer
no lower price for equivalent rooms, neither on other platforms, nor on their own
booking system. There exists little theoretical and empirical work on the compet-
itive impact of MFN clauses. We plan to work with Thomas Larrieu on this issue
first from a theoretical perspective, before making an empirical analysis with data
he has started to collect.
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3.4 Category captains
Because they sell an increasing variety of products, retailers often are confronted
with insufficient knowledge about each product category. Category management
became widespread in the early 1990’s in order to overcome this lack of infor-
mation and improve how retailers answer the consumer’s needs. Retailers often
entrust a Category Captain to help them managing a product category: the UK
Competition Commission, for instance, defines a “category captain” or “category
manager” as “a supplier invited by a retailer to provide advice, research and make
recommendations to optimize how that retailer stocks and sells all product (in-
cluding competing product) within a particular grocery category.”5 A category
captain is thus a producer involved in decisions that affect not only its products,
but also those of its competitors. Typically, the category captain gives advice on
how to present the products, how to organize promotional policies, and shares in-
formation on market trends and consumer shopping behavior. Subramanian et al.
(2010) quote the example of Kraft Foods who was selected as category captain for
the pourable dressings category, and “demonstrated to retailers that changing the
relative placement of [the products could increase] category volume by 12.3%.”
The information and advice provided by category captains may thus bring effi-
ciency benefits, but such arrangements are also a growing concern for competition
authorities. A recent report by the French Competition Authority (2010a) points
out that the status of category captains is “an informal process marked by a signifi-
cant lack of transparency”. The French Competition Authority then mentions that
there are risks of exclusionary conduct resulting from the category captain’s pos-
sible influence in stores, and risks connected to exclusive transfers of information.
Furthermore, the Authority also mentions risks of horizontal concerted practices
connected to category management relationships (both between distributors and
between suppliers). I have two research projects on these issues. The first one
5See Competition Commission, 2005, Cott Beverages / Macaw
(Holdings) merger inquiry, Glossary, available at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141250/http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/ assets/
competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-inquiry/rep−pub/reports/2006/ fulltext/512glossary.pdf
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is joint with Claire Chambolle and Patrick Rey, and the second one is joint with
Cle´mence Christin.
In the first project, we plan to focus on potential foreclosure effects of cate-
gory captain arrangements on rival manufacturers, resulting from the information
exchanged by the retailer and its category captain. Our starting point is the obser-
vation that the successful development of a manufacturer’s project often requires
the exchange of sensitive information with its distributors. In particular, the pro-
motional activities associated with the launch of new products generally require
advance planning with the main retailers. But since category captaincy involves
intense exchanges of data and know-how between the retailer and its category
captain, it can give the captain an access to strategic information about its com-
petitors’ projects. That is, rival manufacturers can be concerned that strategic
information about their product development plans, marketing strategies, and so
forth, that need to be passed on to retailers, may end-up being disclosed to those
competitors who enjoy a category captain position. Providing the category captain
with advanced information about the launch of a new product may for example
reduce or even eliminate the lead time before the apparition of an imitation, and
thus partly dissipate the profit expected from the innovation.
In this project, we consider category captaincy as an organizational choice
that enhances the information flow between a retailer and one of its supplier.
This information flow confers the category captain the advantage of being able
to know about its competitors plans to launch new products, thus creating a
risk of imitation. Being a category captain thus increases the expected profit of
a manufacturer, while facing a category captain reduces a manufacturer’s profit
because of imitation. This creates distortions in the incentives to innovate: ex
ante, the category captain increases its investment while the competitor reduces
it. In that framework, we are interested to see how competition for category
captaincy may affect these distortions. Furthermore, we are interested in the
effect of category captaincy on the probability of innovation, on consumer surplus
as well as on welfare.
In the second project with Cle´mence Christin, we take a different perspective.
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We do not consider the information issues, but we view the category captain as
the provider of a service that will boost demand for all the products of a given
line. However, the impact of this effort is differentiated across the products. We
consider the intensity of spillovers as a parameter (that can even be negative).
In this framework, we are interested in a retailer’s choice of category captains
for her different lines of products. We specifically study how choosing the same
manufacturer as a category captain for several lines of products may affect the
retailer’s bargaining power in the negotiations with her suppliers.
3.5 Cartels
Finally, I would like to carry out research on the implementation of competition
policy, especially in the field of cartels. First, from an applied perspective, I would
like to carry on with the work I have started on the fines set by the European
Commission, and investigate whether fines set by national Antitrust Authorities,
for instance in France and in other european countries, are at the right level. A first
look at data I have on a rather narrow period (between 2008 and 2010) seems to
indicate that, everything else being equal, fines imposed by the French Competition
Authority are much lower than the fines set by the European Commission. I
am currently building a more thorough database on the fines set by the French
Competition Authority since 2006 in order to better study this issue. In the long
run I would also like to go further in investigating the optimal design of fines, and
their interactions with the detection effort.
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